The South Atlantic realm: emerging from obscurity

In our most recent publication we argued in favor of exploring the possibility of a cooperative platform for the economies of the Southern Hemisphere, with the largest economies of the Global South such as Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa potentially playing a key role in this effort[1]. While recognizing the enormity and the scale of the project, one may also observe that there are three sub-regions of the Southern Hemisphere that include the South Atlantic, the South Pacific and the Indo-Pacific regions. The prospects of boosting closer economic ties across these three regions of the Southern Hemisphere may vary due to high distance separation and/or the varying intensity of trade and investment ties, but there may be nonetheless a case for building on the economic integration in these sub-regions to then arrive at a more cooperative economic outlook for the Southern Hemisphere as a whole once these sub-regional integration platforms are brought closer together. We begin then with a look at the region of the South Atlantic that may be considered as the one of the most important parts of the Southern Hemisphere for boosting South-South economic ties.

One of the factors that makes the South Atlantic a promising platform for South-South cooperation is that it lies between two continents of the developing world (Africa and South America), representing thus a region that is dominated by emerging economies. The overall number of coastal developing economies that surround the South Atlantic and are positioned to the south of the equator is just 10, including 3 in South America (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) as well as 7 in Africa (South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Congo, the DRC, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe[2]).

Most importantly, the South Atlantic region already has some of the key preconditions for building a comprehensive framework for regional economic cooperation. A cornerstone of such regional efforts is the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS or ZPCAS) launched in 1986 by the UN (Res 41/11). This agreement serves as a transcontinental forum for dialogue and targets the prevention of nuclear weapons, reduction in foreign military presence, and the promotion of maritime cooperation among 24 South American and African economies. After a prolonged period of inactivity, the grouping has resumed meetings and discussions after the Ministerial meeting in Cape Verde in 2023[3]. This 2023 gathering resulted in the adoption of the the Mindelo Declaration and the Mindelo Action Plan (PAM 2023) – paragraph 5 of the Declaration states the importance of forging closer ties between the continental platforms of the South Atlantic, namely the African Union and UNASUR[4]. Brazil is to host the IX Ministerial Meeting and assumes the Pro Tempore Presidency of ZOPACAS in 2026[5].

In the trade sphere, another supportive pillar for South Atlantic cooperation is the Mercosur-South African Customs Union (SACU) preferential trade agreement that entered into force in 2016[6]. Both regional blocs obtain concessions on over 1000 (all sectors) tariff lines, with the preference margins ranging between 10%-100%[7]. The agreement also advances closer ties in such areas as customs cooperation, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures[8]. The data on trade between SACU and Mercosur since the launching of the PTA point to conflicting trends – on the positive side is the reduction in South Africa’s trade deficit with Mercosur from 2016 to 2020, on the other hand both SA’s imports and exports did not increase substantially by 2020 compared to 2016[9] – perhaps reflecting in part the scope for further deepening the trade agreement in order for it to have a greater effect. In this respect, the impulse to South-South trade from the Mercosur-SACU accord could be reinforced and scaled up to the level of the African Continental FTA (AfCFTA), particularly in view of the experience that Mercosur has accumulated from the discussions on a large-scale FTA with the EU.

In building the bridges across the South Atlantic between Africa and South America, developing economies will be guided by the experience in the North Atlantic associated with the building of ties between the US, Canada and the EU. This Northern experience is a mixed bag thus far –the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that would have liberalized trade and investment between the US and the EU did not go through and was superseded in 2025 by an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair and Balanced Trade. In the case of Canada and the EU there was the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CEPA) singed in 2016 – it entered into force provisionally in September 2017[10]. The latter agreement is subject to provisional application, meaning that after 2017 more than 98% tariffs were eliminated, with the full application to follow after all EU members ratify the agreement. The South Atlantic economies could make more headway and improve on this Northern experience by concluding a comprehensive pact that includes not only provisions on trade and investment, but also cooperation between regional integration blocs, protection of labor standards and the environmental protection of the South Atlantic basin.

The gravity forces in trade across the South Atlantic are likely to be dominated by the flows between two BRICS heavyweights – South Africa and Brazil. And while the high distance factor between Africa and Latin America is a deterrent in boosting trade ties, it is not as extreme as some of the the inter-continental distances in the Pacific or the distances in the North Atlantic between the US and continental Europe. In the case of South America and Africa the shortest distance is between Brazil’s city of Natal (capital city of the country’s region Rio Grande do Norte) and Senegal or Guinea-Bissau is approximately 2800-3000 km (and 3 hours time difference), while the shortest distance between the US and mainland Europe (Portugal) is nearly twice as long (time difference is 5 hours).  

The sectoral trade structure for Africa and South America does not reveal as much complementarity as is so glaringly visible in the contours of the two continental coastlines across the South Atlantic – in both cases agriculture and commodities form a significant part of the export base. This is why there is a need to forge ahead with greater trade diversification – geographically via boosting the Africa-South America and South-South trade as well as across sectors via building joint value-added/production chains and expanding trade into the services sector. On this latter count, greater activism is already underway in boosting trans-Atlantic tourism, with South Africa and Brazil leading the way. In particular, after the introduction of simplified visa regimes and greater air connectivity (through expanding the number of direct flights) across both countries, the number of visitors increased almost three-fold since 2022 from South Africa to Brazil and also several-fold for the reverse travel direction[11].

More generally, the role of the South Atlantic region in the global economy may be expanded via positioning it not only as a key engine of South-South cooperation, but also as part of a broader effort to build a thriving, neutral and peaceful community in the Southern Hemisphere. The South Atlantic region could advance the paradigm of “open regionalism” with cooperative ties to other parts of the Southern Hemisphere[12]. The region may serve thus as a “constructive contrast effect” to its Northern neighbor through greater openness to trade and allegiance to neutrality. It may also develop back-up/reserve technological and logistical capabilities for the global economy with respect to alternative communication lines (the BRICS cable project[13]), value/production chains, energy supply systems, payment systems in case of disruptions emanating from the conflict-ridden Northern Hemisphere.  

Overall, recent developments suggest that the South Atlantic is emerging from the shadows – after being neglected for decades, it is starting to exhibit signs of greater activism and focus from outside of the region[14]. Back in 2021 Mercosur and the African Union initiated cooperation talks[15], which was followed by a high-level meeting between the African Union and CELAC representatives in 2025[16]. At the end of 2025 Brazil’s President Lula made several official visits to Africa, calling for closer ties between Mercosur and Africa and importantly emphasizing the need for building ties between the largest economic blocs on both sides of the South Atlantic: “we want to diversify exports, generate jobs, and integrate our production chains with our Global South partners. There is room to explore synergies between the African Free Trade Area and Mercosur”[17].

For the Global South as a whole, the region of South Atlantic represents a key juncture of the two continental integration projects – a region that may prove to be crucial for the efforts of the developing world to launch economic cooperation on the basis of “integration of integrations”. Indeed, the South Atlantic may emerge in the future as the key runway in the cross-continental trade and investment flows across the developing world, while also serving as the most favorable and feasible platform for inter-continental cooperative links across the Global South. This in turn may warrant a greater focus from BRICS in supporting the regional integration efforts in the South Atlantic, including via NDB connectivity projects (port facilities along the South Atlantic coast) as well as inviting the ZOPACAS presidency to the BRICS summits.   


[1] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/hemispheric-perspectives-from-down-under/

[2] Equatorial Guinea could also be included into this group as one of its islands lies to the south of the equator, though the mainland territory is not crossed by the equator.

[3] https://theguide.com.br/defense/what-is-zopacas-and-why-is-it-important/

[4] https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/relacoes-internacionais/foruns-internacionais-1/zona-de-paz-e-cooperacao-do-atlantico-sul-zopacas/arquivos/mindelo-declaration-final-version.pdf

[5] https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/relacoes-internacionais/foruns-internacionais-1/zona-de-paz-e-cooperacao-do-atlantico-sul-zopacas

[6] Mercosur report Nº 26: MERCOSUR: strategic divergences and pragmatic consensus / Celina Pena, Julieta Zelicovich, Vera Thorstensen, Catherine Mota; coordinators, Ricardo Rozemberg, Sofía Sternberg.

[7] https://nda.gov.za/images/Branches/Economica%20Development%20Trade%20and%20Marketing/international-trade-and-promotions/trade-facilitation/information-packs-18-august-2021/sacu-mercosur-pta.pdf

[8] https://nda.gov.za/images/Branches/Economica%20Development%20Trade%20and%20Marketing/international-trade-and-promotions/trade-facilitation/information-packs-18-august-2021/sacu-mercosur-pta.pdf

[9] https://nda.gov.za/images/Branches/Economica%20Development%20Trade%20and%20Marketing/international-trade-and-promotions/trade-facilitation/information-packs-18-august-2021/sacu-mercosur-pta.pdf

[10] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en

[11] https://diplomacybeyond.com/brazil-and-south-africa-to-boost-tourism-and-trade/

[12] https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Overview-of-ASEAN-MERCOSUR-as-of-Jan-2024.pdf

[13] https://www.subseacables.net/industry-news/brazil-reignites-brics-submarine-cable-project-with-2025-feasibility-study-proposal/

[14] https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/southern-currents-mapping-geopolitics-south-atlantic#:~:text=However%2C%20bilateral%20memorandums%20of%20understanding,Africa%20of%20committing%20’genocide‘.

[15] https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/en/announcements/news/mercosur-and-african-union-initiate-trade-and-cooperation-talks

[16] https://au.int/pt/node/45260#:~:text=April%2027%2C%202025.%20AUSSOM%20Ministerial%20Meeting%20report.,%C2%B7%20Reports%20%C2%B7%20Second%20Continental%20Report%20on

[17] https://valorinternational.globo.com/foreign-affairs/news/2025/11/25/lula-urges-mercosur-to-draw-closer-to-africa.ghtml

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

Image by lucasgeorgewendt via Pixabay


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