One of our long-standing policy prescriptions in the sphere of global economic governance has been the creation of a regional 20 (R20) engagement group within the G20 that would include the main regional integration arrangements and allow for greater inclusivity in the operations of this global economic forum[1]. We also argued in our T20 paper in 2024[2] that such an R20 engagement group could significantly improve the effectiveness of G20 policy initiatives, including with respect to its anti-crisis stimuli. We now proceed to explore which regional blocs could be included into the R20 platform and how the composition of G20 engagement groups could be replicated by other global and regional organizations to strengthen international economic policy coordination.
While the main rationale for advancing the R20 concept was about rendering the G20 platform more connected to the outside world, there appear to be a whole array of economic factors that argue in favor of the creation of such a platform. In the trade sphere a rising number of countries over the past several decades have delegated their trade policy to the level of their respective regional integration arrangement (Mercosur, EAEU, EU, etc.). Hence a revitalized trade liberalization effort in the global economy would have to rely to a greater degree on the coordination and greater openness among the regional integration blocs. In the sphere of macroeconomic stability regional development institutions and financing arrangements could increase the magnitude and the degree of regional penetration of coordinated G20 anti-crisis stimuli. Furthermore, a platform such as R20 would also be instrumental in addressing global challenges that cannot be addressed solely at the level of national economies – climate change and environmental policies being a case in point.
The array of regional integration arrangements that could initially form part of the R20 platform could include the following 10 regional blocs (that all include G20 country members):
- EU (core G20 member)
- African Union (core G20 member)
- Eurasian Economic Union (Russia)
- Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina)
- ASEAN (Indonesia)
- GCC (Saudi Arabia)
- RCEP (China, Japan, South Korea, Australia)
- BIMSTEC (India)
- CPTPP (UK)
- USMCA (US, Mexico, Canada)
This core set of regional arrangements could then be complemented within the R20 by other regional integration blocs that do not necessarily include G20 members:
- EFTA
- CARICOM
- Sistema de la Integration Centroamericana (SICA)
- Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)
- Pacific Alliance
- Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
- APEC
- SCO
- CELAC
- GAFTA (Greater Arab Free Trade Area)
While the list of the core 10 regional integration arrangements within the R20 appears to be quite straightforward to assemble, the list of the additional 10 regional integration arrangements may be more debatable due to greater overlaps in individual country memberships. The most important point, however, is that while the G20 that is composed mostly of individual economies sorely lacks inclusivity vis-à-vis the rest of the global community, an R20 arrangement is far more comprehensive in terms of its coverage of the majority of key regions, regional integration blocs and individual economies.
Some may argue that there are already mechanisms within the G20 for greater outreach to non-G20 members. In particular, during G20 summits some of the regional integration blocs such as ASEAN are invited to participate. Furthermore, within the B20 engagement group there is the Regional Consultation Forum that holds discussions with stakeholders across regions to generate input on G20 policy recommendations. These mechanisms, however, are largely ad hoc and very limited in their outreach, with the R20 harboring far greater scaling possibilities for policy impulses emanating from the G20. Another important advantage of an R20 arrangements is the possibility to use it as a connectivity vehicle with other international organizations and platforms.
For example, if the G20 were to create an R20 platform for regional integration arrangements, the BRICS grouping could open a connectivity gateway with the G20 via creating a platform for regional arrangements of the Global South (our version of such a platform has been the BEAMS framework[3]). Such a platform/arrangement for regional integration blocs could be explored by other groupings, including G7 as well as mega-regionals such as RCEP. The R20 within G20 and its analogs in other international forums and organizations could then serve as connectivity ports with other international forums and organizations.
In a similar vein, in the sphere of micro-regional economic cooperation within BRICS there is the recently created platform for sub-national regions and municipalities – the BRICS+ Association of Cities and Municipalities. Its profile has a lot in common with the Urban 20 (U20) – an engagement group that operates within G20. There could be a case for developing an agenda for the cooperation among these platforms and discussions to be held on topics ranging from exchanging international best practices in urban planning to forming common portfolios of investment projects to finance urban/regional development.
For the G20, complementing the micro-regional U20 engagement group (for sub-national regions) with a macro-regional R20 (for RTAs and other regional integration arrangements) would enable this global platform to widen its range of outreach and policy impulses from the level of sub-national entities to the broader international community across the main regions of the world economy. The combination of these two engagement groups (U20 and R20) within the G20 could also serve as an important scaling mechanism across virtually all other engagement groups – from L20 (Labor 20) to B20 (Business 20) – allowing initiatives and best practices to be scaled across sub-national and supra-national regional levels. Such a triad of U20-G20-R20 (“micro-regional” – national – “macro-regional”) could be replicated in other international organizations, platforms and mega-regional blocs creating thus more scope for connectivity across such platforms and raising significantly their scaling capabilities.
In the end, the modalities and the algorithm for creating a global platform for regional integration arrangements (a regional 20) are well within the realm of what is feasible in today’s world economy. Such a regional engagement group in the G20 could serve as an important scaling mechanism for G20 initiatives, making their effects tangible well beyond the core membership. Furthermore, for the BRICS and other regional/multilateral blocs and platforms to have greater scope to connect with the G20, their own engagement groups and platforms could replicate the profile of some of the key engagement groups of the G20. More generally, in order to raise the scope for scaling and connectivity between various international forums and organizations, there may be a need to align the profile and operations of their respective engagement groups. In a way, this could be the new dimension to the structuring of the operations of international platforms and institutions, namely: increasing their inter-connectivity via creating inter-connectable/linkable engagement groups that widen the scope for outreach and cross-organizational cooperation.
[1] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/scenarios-for-regionalism-in-the-g20/
[2] https://t20brasil.org/media/documentos/arquivos/TF06_ST_01__Potential_modaliti66faf04a984fe.pdf
[3] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/beams-of-the-sunrise-a-look-at-brics-5-year-cycles/
Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics
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