The intensity of geopolitical shocks in the world economy is evidently starting to translate into a marked rise in country coalitions seeking to mitigate or by-pass the tensions between the great powers. Among the most active in this alliance formation are small economies and middle powers, with small economies such as Singapore and New Zealand leading the formation of a FIT partnership in September 2025. Since then this platform expanded in several waves to include more small and mid-sized economies. Most recently, a new platform for middle powers has been launched – this time the Quad of developed and developing economies launching the alliance includes Brazil, Canada, the EU and Kenya. The “Partners for Mutilateralism” platform (P4M) states that its goals include the creation of “a flexible, open framework for countries from different regions and political traditions that are willing to work across divides, to build coalitions for reform and to translate shared principles into practical action”[1].
The P4M alliance bears some resemblance to the recently launched FIT partnership in that it seeks to fill a gap in global governance that has not been duly addressed in the status-quo construct with respect to small and medium-sized powers. As was the case with FIT, the P4M is launched by a quadrilateral coalition that includes developed and developing economies. Like FIT, the new platform also positions itself as an agile formation that eschews red tape – in the FT article that enunciated the main principles of the coalition, its leaders note that “P4M is not about creating another exclusive bloc or another international bureaucracy, [but rather] to create a flexible and open network to support the work of the UN and other multilateral platforms”[2].
The composition of the P4M platform points to the global scope for its operation, with all 4 initial members coming from different continents – Canada from North America, Brazil from South America, Kenya from Africa and the EU from Eurasia. It also suggests that the key goals include building linkages across the North-South axis between the middle powers from the developed world and the Global South. But perhaps the key rationale is to create a global constituency that is more immune to the US-China antagonism and that has a powerful collective voice on the global stage. The presence of the European Union as a group may also leave open the possibility of further expansion in the platform being driven by additional regional blocs, including those from the Global South.
From an economic standpoint, the P4M alliance may seek to capitalize on some of the economic partnerships within this group that have been developing recently, including the EU-Canada partnership (to the degree that the EU is exploring the possibility of granting Canada associate membership[3]), EU-Mercosur FTA (negotiations finalized and signed in January 2026) as well as Canada-Mercosur FTA discussions – the latter is expected to be clinched by the end of 2026. On this basis, the P4M may seek to build alliances within the multilateral organizations such as the WTO to counter the mounting global protectionist pressures.
At the same time, supply chain resilience and geopolitical risk mitigation could be more challenging within such a platform given the significant economic dependency of Canada on the US and the severity of the geopolitics in Europe. The platform would also not be completely impervious to electoral swings in some of its members – an unfavorable electoral outcome in Brazil this year could potentially undermine the country’s position in this platform. Another issue is the possibility of tensions/competition among the regional/middle powers – as we noted back in 2024, “notwithstanding its potential benefits, the creation of a platform for middle/regional powers may be fraught with difficulties. One of the pitfalls in this respect is the intra-regional competition and tensions among some of the middle powers that are striving for regional leadership”[4] – this risk is likely to rise together with the expansion in the platform’s membership.
Looking ahead, the ranks of the P4M platform could well expand via the middle powers in Asia, most notably such ASEAN economies as Vietnam, Malaysia and/or Indonesia. Other potential members from Asia that could join may include Japan and South Korea. In other regions, economies such as Australia, Morocco, Mexico, Turkey are also likely to explore the potential benefits of joining the new platform. In global organizations and conferences the P4M is likely to seek coalition-building with the FIT Partnership as well as the MIKTA economies. Lastly, more trans-continental and trans-regional platforms such as the P4M could emerge in the coming years, as middle powers seek to re-position themselves in the changing conditions of the world economy and global power politics. Our proposed platform for the middle powers of the Southern Hemisphere (S5) is one such possibility, other scenarios also include a greater role for regional integration arrangements and the “integration of integrations” platforms being led by key regional/middle powers.
P.S.: Back in mid-2023 we noted the key role that middle powers would play in the re-assembly of the global economy – as we observed then “there may also be increasing competition for swaying these economies closer to either the BRICS or the advanced economy camp, akin to the competition witnessed in the electoral process at the national level over the electoral range close to the “median voter”. And it is this “median voter” that will likely increasingly drive outcomes and decisions in the re-assembled global economy”[5].
In 2024, we further noted the likely momentum in middle powers seeking to form their coalitions on the international stage: “After the largest economies of the world have already built their platforms such as G7, G20, BRICS, small and medium-sized economies are starting to explore the possibilities for building various new platforms to fit their priorities and national interests. The so-called middle powers, economies that are among the leaders in their respective regions, are looking to explore the possibilities of joining platforms that may enable them to play a more active/prominent role on the global stage”[6].
In 2025 we published an article titled “The golden middle of the world economy”, where we explored the “reasons why in today’s setting there is a need and scope for middle powers to play a greater role in the global economy and global economic governance”[7]. In particular, we wrote about what we referred to as the “middle power trap”, whereby “despite their notable potential, middle powers appeared to be somewhat left out in the current system of global governance that favored large developed economies”[8]. We further argued in the article that “greater consolidation of middle powers and their ability to exploit their comparative advantages in boosting regional (RTA) and inter-regional (inter-RTA) trade could improve their longer term growth potential”[9]. We noted that global platforms for middle powers could be launched by regional blocs such as ASEAN, particularly if power politics among the heavyweights in existing blocs leaves little room for middle/regional powers to achieve their goals.
In the beginning of 2026 we proposed our version of a platform for middle powers that would bring together developing and developed economies – the scope however was semi-global rather than global. The latter was done to lower the scale of geopolitical risks and the exposure to the US-China rivalry by focusing squarely on the middle powers of the Southern Hemisphere – hence the platform named the Southern Five that brings together the G20 members of the Southern Hemisphere. As is the case with P4M, Brazil is a key member of the proposed S5 platform and is likely to feature as the leading force in the further waves of coalitions of middle powers. As we noted then: “interestingly, there is already a somewhat similar group of countries composed of G20 economies, namely MIKTA – Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia. This group brings together advanced and developing/emerging markets, and just like the S5 could serve as a potential connection between the Global North and the Global South as well as a platform for strengthening the global stature of “middle powers”. Compared to the MIKTA grouping, however, the S5 may have the benefit of greater regional/hemispheric identity as well as commonality in some of the key objectives in the international economic agenda, including with respect to environmental policy and agriculture”[10].
[1] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-21/carney-lula-urge-nations-to-join-group-to-unite-middle-powers;
[2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-21/carney-lula-urge-nations-to-join-group-to-unite-middle-powers
[3] https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/canada-wants-closer-ties-with-europe-but-what-would-eu-associate-membership-mean?ai-allowed=1
[4] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/platforms-for-small-economies-exploring-the-landscape/
[5] https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/07/06/brics-regional-powers-a-re-assembly-of-the-global-economy/
[6] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/platforms-for-small-economies-exploring-the-landscape/
[7] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/the-golden-middle-of-the-world-economy/
[8] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/the-golden-middle-of-the-world-economy/
[9] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/the-golden-middle-of-the-world-economy/
[10] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/the-southern-five-a-platform-to-balance-the-global-economy/
Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics
Image by geralt via Pixabay