With all the discussions about BRICS institutionalization taking on greater momentum – the group’s institutionalization was singled out as a key priority in the past several BRICS summit declarations – one of the more exciting questions in these debates may be the expediency of the establishment of permanent headquarters for the bloc. Even more fascinating and far-reaching may be the choice of the location of the BRICS Headquarters and Secretariat. After all, this choice may reveal the bloc’s key priorities in terms of its future regional development and expansion. While we explored at length the case for and against BRICS institutionalization, we now focus on the issue of the location of a possible BRICS headquarters/institutions.
Thus far discussions on the headquarters of the bloc have not featured in public discussions and it is far from clear as to whether the choice in favor of establishing a permanent headquarters is going to be made at all. Yet, if BRICS institutionalization is to advance in the coming years, such a scenario of the creation of a permanent Secretariat may become an increasingly likely prospect. Indeed, at the recent summit of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), one of the key messages was the bloc’s prioritization of institutionalization, including “through the establishment of an effective RCEP Secretariat”. So what are the options?
Within the grand scheme of things, the choice may revolve around the three main regions of the Global South – Africa, Latin America and Eurasia. Each of the three options has its economic rationale, well beyond the many political and/or short-term considerations that may also be thrown into the boiling pot of this BRICS+ debate:
- Africa: the future generations argument. The future of the global economy will be increasingly tied to Africa as a growing share of the young population will come from that continent. According to the IMF, “by 2030, half of all new entrants into the global labor force will come from sub-Saharan Africa”[1]. Africa as a whole will deliver the largest contribution to global population growth in the coming decades, with its share in global population expected to reach a quarter by 2050 and 40% by 2100[2]. Furthermore, 13 out of 20 largest cities in the world by 2100 are to be concentrated in Africa, including all of the top-3 positions in this ranking[3]. A rising share of the global youth, global population and global human capital – this is the case for Africa in its simplest form.
- Eurasia: the center of gravity argument. Most of the bloc’s heavyweights such as India, China, Russia, Indonesia are based in Eurasia. Furthermore, a significant majority of BRICS core members as well as the members of the expanded BRICS+ together with the partnership belt come from Eurasia. The bulk of trade and investment flows in the BRICS+ domain are concentrated in Eurasia.
- Latin America: the new frontiers argument. Latin America has the lowest representation in the BRICS core and in the expanded BRICS+ with the partnership circle. At the same time, Latin America is witnessing heated debates on the merits of joining BRICS, with Argentina being the only invited country to reject the invitation so far. Latin America also has significant scope to expand regional integration as well as boost South-South trade (intra-continental and inter-continental) from rather subdued levels currently. If BRICS is to build bridges of economic cooperation with Latin America and become more inclusive as a bloc of the Global South, this region of the world economy merits greater prioritization in BRICS institutionalization efforts.
There may be still other arguments and rationales such as symbolism and Global South history, which would argue in favor of cities such as Bandung (Indonesia) that held the historic conference 70 years ago marking earlier initiatives of the Global South to change the course of global development. Another possible perspective would be to designate next-generation inland locations for BRICS Headquarters that could serve as drivers of national economic development and greater connectivity across the Global South. Whichever of the above arguments is made, however, I would not venture as to make a definitive and exclusive choice between the three regions/centers of the Global South – Africa, Latin America and Eurasia – as it is crucial that no part of the developing world is left out from the institutional development of the BRICS bloc.
But, perhaps, there is a way for the BRICS to innovate in the sphere of institutionalization and position the various branches of BRICS emerging institutions in all the three regions of the Global South. For example (and this is a very tentative and hypothetical scenario), the BRICS Secretariat could be located in Eurasia, the BRICS Parliament/Parliamentary Assembly (if ever created[4]) in Africa and the legal mechanism for resolving trade/investment disputes[5] in Latin America. Instead of divisions, the BRICS institutionalization (spanning the executive, legislative/parliamentary and judicial spheres) could thus advance inclusivity and equal participation of all of the main regions of the developing world.
In fact, this geographical diversity of the emerging BRICS institutional framework may be already deduced to some degree from the evolution and expansion in the operations of the New Development Bank. In particular, we note the creation of the regional centers of BRICS NDB in the main regions of the Global South (Eurasia, Africa, Latin America) and member economies of the BRICS-5.
This scope for greater geographical divergence in the institutional development of BRICS may be even more impressive if BRICS opted to forge ahead with the creation of a full-fledged BRICS CRA – an arrangement that if institutionalized would need to be headquartered closer to the recipients in Latin America or in Africa. Other potential institutional mechanisms include the headquarters for the BRICS grain exchange (to be headquartered likely in economies that are leading producers) or the newly created BRICS Multilateral Guarantees (BMG) mechanism that is to operate within the framework of NDB but could be headquartered in Latin America with coordination from the local regional office of the Bank.
And there may be many more platforms that are sectoral (for example potential platforms for producers of precious metals) or regional in scope (such as the BRICS forum for municipalities) that if institutionalized would add to the variety of BRICS geographical mosaic. This geographical diversity in the BRICS emerging institutional framework stands in stark contrast to the limited variety of locations in the current status-quo system dominated by the US East Coast (UN in New York and the Bretton Woods institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank based in Washington DC) and a number of locations in Europe (WTO in Geneva).
In the end, I have to emphasize yet again that it is still very much an open question whether the BRICS bloc will in fact opt to create its own Headquarters and Secretariat. After all, the BRICS have not yet exhausted the scope for exploiting the myriads of economic cooperation formats (such as platforms and alliances between regional integration blocs) that do not require the operation of a Secretariat. Nonetheless, the winds of change in the Global South do point towards greater coordination, and the greater the challenges posed to BRICS as a bloc, the greater the likelihood of an accelerated pace in the group’s institutionalization.
[2] Andrew Stanley. African century. Finance and Development. September 2023, pp. 16-17
[3] https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/07/by-2100-none-of-the-worlds-biggest-cities-will-be-in-china-the-us-or-europe/
[5] https://www.bricscompetition.org/about/who-we-are
Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics
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